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STOCK TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS
AND ISSUER CHOICE IN TRADING
VENUES
Jonathan Maceyt & Maureen O'Hara*
INTRODUCTION
The recent spate of corporate scandals (Enron, Tyco, etc.) opened
a "policy window" through which Congress and the executive were
able to overcome the strong interest group pressures resisting federal
usurpation of the states' traditional autonomy over the regulation of
the internal affairs of corporate firms. Congress's response to Enron
and its successors was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX"), which is
designed to improve corporate accountability and to assert the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission as a major force in competition with
the states in the production of corporate law rules.'
The Securities and Exchange Commission also responded to its
new role by proposing rules to enhance the role of shareholders in
electing directors. Much of corporate America observes, correctly,
that SOX has increased costs with little or no benefit2 and that the
SEC's proposals will diminish the effectiveness of corporate boards
by provoking friction.
t Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance, and Securities Regulation,
Yale Law School.
t Robert W. Purcell Professor of Finance, Johnson Graduate School of Management,
Cornell University The authors are greatful to Stephanie Bredermann, Yale Law School class of
2007 for valuable research assistance.
1Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, inter alia, makes corporate officers responsible for earnings reports, forbids account-
ing firms from acting as consultants to accounting clients, and stiffens penalties for fraud. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law in July, 2002.
2 Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Gov-
ernance, 114 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2005).
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This article starts with the premise that, while the proper role of
corporate law is to reduce transaction costs by providing efficiently
configured "off-the-rack" legal rules, the proper role of corporate
governance is to promote transparency and to create an efficient con-
tracting space in which investors can configure rules that reduce
agency costs by aligning the interests of managers with their own
interests.
Much attention has been paid of late to the relative merits of the
states versus the federal government as the optimal locus for generat-
ing laws related to corporate governance of U.S. corporations. Less
attention has been paid to the continued relevance, if any, of the joint
production of corporate governance rules by public companies and
stock exchanges. This is odd because the stock exchanges, in rival-
rous competition with other trading venues for listings and trading
volume, long have taken the view that producing efficient, investor-
friendly corporate law rules is an important component of the bundle
of liquidity services they must offer. Thus, one must consider the
relevance of the production of corporate law rules by stock exchanges
to the perceived crisis in American corporate governance revealed in
the Enron-era scandals and the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in order to
be able fully to evaluate the range of policy options available to con-
front the ostensible problem.
Further, it seems clear that issuers have, or should have, an intense
interest in the venue where their securities trade, if for no other reason
than to ensure a robust, liquid, high-quality market for their firms'
shares. Firms traditionally have considered trading venues important,
and are concerned about the quality of the corporate governance rules
on the exchanges on which they list. This article explains why this
may no longer be the case, and what the implications are for corporate
governance.
This article continues our exploration of the law and economics of
trading venues. Building on our organizing framework that describes
the economic development of stock exchanges 3 the article then ana-
3 See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Economics of Stock Exchange Listing
Fees and Listing Requirements, 11 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 297, 298 (2002) [hereinafter Stock
Exchange Listing Fees] (investigating "the once and future role of listing fees"); Jonathan R.
Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Globalization, Exchange Governance, and the Future of Exchanges,
in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 1999 1, 1 (R. Litan and A. San-
tomero eds., 1999) [hereinafter Future of Exchanges] (identifying "three ways in which the
competitive environment has changed); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Regulating
Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective, 28 J. LEGAL
STUD. 17, 19 (1999) [hereinafter Regulating Exchanges] (providing "a law and economic per-
spective on the regulation of [alternative trading systems]"); see also, Jonathan Macey & Hideki
Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutes For the New York
and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1007, 1008 (1990) [hereinafter The Stock
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lyzes the three critical issues that relate to the production of corporate
law by stock exchanges. These issues are the modem emergence of
multi-market trading venues, the ability of exchanges to grant unlisted
trading privileges to companies' stocks, and the renewed involvement
of stock exchanges in corporate governance.
The basic business of being a stock exchange has evolved over
time as a result of competitive pressures. Like many other businesses,
the business of being a stock exchange has become "commodified."
The result of this commodification is that the business of being a
stock exchange has transformed from its historical role as a quasi-
governmental entity that had highly complex, multi-dimensional rela-
tionships with listed firms, into far more simple firms that focus on
the marketing of a single service: the provision of liquidity to traders,
investors, and, ultimately, to listed firms. Because different investors
have radically different needs for and preferences about liquidity, a
number of different trading venues have arisen to serve the needs of
these investors. A single exchange or trading venue is, therefore,
unlikely to be able to satisfy the needs of all investors. As a result,
we have observed the emergence of multi-market trading.4 In other
words, just as the range of services historically offered by exchanges
has begun to narrow to a single service-the provision of
liquidity-the competition to provide that single service has in-
creased.
Three related policy questions emerge from this analysis. The first
question, a legal question, is whether issuers of securities should be
able to select the venue where their securities trade and to thereby
restrict, if they so choose, the trading in their securities to a particular
venue. To this question we offer a qualified "yes." That is, issuers
should, as a normative matter, have the authority to determine the
venue or venues where their securities trade, so long as they do so
when the conflicts of interest between insiders and investors are low,
i.e., at the time when the securities initially are offered to the public.
The second question that this article addresses is the extent to
which current U.S. law addresses the issues raised by such choice.
Specifically, we ask whether U.S. companies could, if they so wished,
Exchange as a Firm] (articulating "the economic underpinnings of organized stock exchanges").
I Securities listed on an organized stock exchange can trade simultaneously on other
stock exchanges, and on the NASDAQ (NASDAQ is an acronym for the National Association
of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System) and the National Market System (the Na-
tional Market System is comprised of the most liquid securities traded on NASDAQ or reported
on the consolidated tape by NASDAQ). In addition, securities traded on an exchange, or on
NASDAQ, may be traded simultaneously on private trading systems (Automated Traded Sys-
tems (ATSs) and Electronic Communications Networks (ECNs)) and on the "Pink Sheets."
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effectively restrict the venues on which their firms' securities could
legally trade. We argue that firms probably could, if they wanted to,
restrict the venues on which their securities trade through the use of
stock transfer restrictions. Specifically, the Uniform Commercial
Code empowers issuing companies and investors to agree to restrict
future share transfers, subject to certain limitations on unreasonable
or undisclosed restrictions. Thus, for example, a restriction to limit
the trading in a company's security to a particular trading venue, such
as the New York Stock Exchange, would, in our view, be reasonable,
provided that the company issuing the security could articulate a rea-
sonable justification for imposing this restriction.
Finally, we observe that, as an empirical matter, issuers do not, in
fact, attempt to limit the venues on which their securities trade. We
argue that this is because the costs to issuers and investors of such a
limitation outweigh any potential benefits. Multi-venue securities
trading is, in other words, beneficial to both issuers and investors.
Issues that attempted to impose or enforce such restrictions would
find themselves at a competitive disadvantage in the capital markets.
A further, more general assumption embedded in this analysis is
that stock exchanges are not particularly useful venues for the produc-
tion of certain kinds of corporate law rules. While the production of
corporate law rules has been one of the traditional functions of stock
exchanges, as we have observed elsewhere stock exchanges have
been replaced by a variety of other entities and institutions. As a
purely positive matter, it is somewhat misleading to describe stock
exchanges as firms that generate corporate governance rules in an
environment of jurisdictional competition for corporate charters.
Rather, the exchanges simply generate rules on behalf of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission that the Commission could not gener-
ate itself due to the legal restrictions that courts have imposed on its
administrative authority. 5 From a normative perspective, it probably
would be better to leave the production of corporate governance rules
to the individual states. Barring that, however, if the SEC is going to
continue to take the leading role in generating corporate governance
rules, it would be more desirable to have them do so directly, rather
than by using the exchanges as subterfuges.
This article is organized as follows: In Part I, we describe the grad-
ual evolution that has taken place in the economic function of stock
exchanges over the past few decades. Part II addresses the legal issue
of whether U.S. firms could, if they wished, restrict the venues on
5 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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which their securities trade. Part m examines the implications of the
above analysis for today's work of multi-venue trading.
While U.S. firms may no longer be interested in selecting a par-
ticular trading venue in order to improve their perception among in-
vestors, or in order to distinguish their corporate governance from
other firms, they may wish to select a particular trading venue in or-
der to improve the liquidity with which their shares trade, or for other,
more nefarious reasons, such as to make hostile takeovers more diffi-
cult and expensive. We argue that, although restrictions on multi-
venue trading may harm shareholders by making takeovers more dif-
ficult, they are highly unlikely to help shareholders. Thus, the current
system of multi-market trading in the U.S. is efficient. Finally, Part
IV examines the ongoing role of stock exchanges in the production of
corporate governance rules for listed firms. We find that this role has
become severely limited as a result of multi-market trading.
I. THE COMMODIFCATION OF STOCK EXCHANGES
Our understanding of the nature of stock exchanges has evolved
dramatically. 6  We now have come to understand that, while ex-
changes have many of the characteristics of markets, the conception
of exchanges that conforms best to economic reality is that they "are
firms that generate revenues by sponsoring trading in financial in-
struments." 7 Exchanges, like other firms, compete for market share.
Stock exchanges pre-date the securities laws. From their incep-
tion, they offered investors a complex array of services that included,
among other things, listing standards and corporate governance rules
that were a substitute for government regulation.8 More specifically,
stock exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange historically
offered its listing-firm clients a bundle of services with the following
five components: (1) monitoring of exchange trading against manipu-
6 See Macey & O'Hara, Stock Exchange Listing Fees, supra note 3, at 298 (investigating
"the once and future role of listing fees"); Macey & O'Hara, Future of Exchanges, supra note 3,
at 1 (identifying "three ways in which the competitive environment has changed); Macey &
O'Hara, Regulating Exchanges, supra note 3, at 19 (providing "a law and economic perspective
on the regulation of [alternative trading systems]"); see also, Macey & Kanda, The Stock Ex-
change as a Firm, supra note 3, at 1008 (articulating "the economic underpinnings of organized
stock exchanges").
7 Jonathan Macey & Maureen O'Hara, From Markets to Venues: Security Regulation in
an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter From Markets to Ven-
ues]; Macey & O'Hara, Stock Exchange Listing Fees, supra note 3, at 1008; Guido Ferrarini,
Exchange Governance and Regulation: An Overview, 27 Annali Della Facolti di Giurispruda
di Genova 3 (1995).
8 Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54
SMU L. REV. 325, 327 (2001).
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lation and insider trading; (2) the provision of standard-form, off-the-
rack legal rules to reduce transaction costs for investors; (3) a signal-
ing function to inform investors that the issuing company's stock is of
high quality; (4) clearing services to ensure that secondary partici-
pants receive timely payment for securities sold and timely delivery
of securities purchased; and (5) the promise of liquidity, often, but not
always, backed by an affirmative obligation on the part of exchange
specialists to "maintain fair and orderly markets" in the stocks in
which they specialize. 9
The complex array of products and services traditionally offered
by the exchange gradually has become "unbundled." Each of these
component parts-except for liquidity-is now offered by other,
more specialized, and often superior, providers. And often these
other providers offer these services to traders for free because the
costs associated with delivering these services either are subsidized
by the government or are paid for by the listing firms themselves.
In a nutshell, the contract between the NYSE and listing firms
was:
highly contextual and relational. The complex bundle of ser-
vices provided by exchanges to listing firms resulted in a re-
lationship characterized by long-term mutual dependency.
Each side had asset-specific relations with the other that
raised the specter of exploitation through opportunistic be-
havior. But the fact that such specific investments were re-
ciprocal reduced the incentives for one-shot opportunism.10
Put differently, in the past, a core feature of the economic relationship
between listing firms and stock exchanges was that each side de-
pended heavily on the maintenance of the listing." The Exchange
depended on the listing for fees and trading revenues; the listing firm
depended on the Exchange as a source of liquidity in its shares. Such
interdependence was not typically found in other types of exchange
markets. For example, futures exchanges, trade commodities, and
listing fees were never part of their revenue structure. Similarly, op-
tion markets, which also do not charge listing fees, have no relation-
ship with the underlying companies whose options they trade. Thus,
9 These economic characteristics are identified and discussed at length in Future of Er-
changes, supra note 3; and in Macey & O'Hara, Regulating Exchanges, supra note 3. See also
RUBEN LEE, WHAT IS AN EXCHANGE? (1999) (discussing four themes of exchanges).
10 See Macey & O'Hara, Future of Exchanges, supra note 3, at 10.
11 Johannes Kondgen, Ownership and Corporate Governance of Stock Exchanges, 154 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 224, 235 (1998).
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futures and options exchanges' entire focus was on the production of
liquidity; stock exchanges traditionally did much more.
The competitive environment under which stock exchanges oper-
ate is different now.' 2 While stock exchanges need revenue to sur-
vive, the proliferation of unlisted and multi-venue trading shows that
maintaining a stock exchange membership is not required to survive
and even prosper. Instead, trading venues can, and often do, survive
on trading volume alone. 13
While these points have been developed elsewhere, we think that it
would be useful to describe the features of the exchange relationship
that were, at one time, the exclusive domain of exchanges in order to
show how close, and generally superior, substitutes have arisen for all
these services. This analysis is reinforced by looking at changes in
the nature of the exchange's clientele, which has evolved from a cus-
tomer base dominated by individual investors trading for their own
accounts to institutional customers, which now represent 70 percent
of the Exchange's transaction volume. 14
This change is relevant because when those purchasing NYSE
shares were largely individuals, the value of the NYSE's function as
monitor, as reputational intermediary, and as supplier of liquidity was
much greater than it is now. By contrast, in today's markets, sophis-
ticated institutional investors use their own analysis, including direct
contact with management, to monitor and evaluate issuers' perform-
ance.
If, for example, listing on the NYSE serves as a successful mecha-
nism for signaling, bonding and otherwise "opting into" honest corpo-
rate reporting and good corporate governance, then firms listed on the
NYSE should have a lower incidence of corporate scandals than other
firms. However, the opposite is true.
A. Monitoring
Investors clearly value the ability to monitor the trading in the
shares they own in order to ensure that their trades are executed at
market prices, and that insiders and market professionals do not en-
gage in insider trading, front-running or market manipulation. Here
12 See Macey & O'Hara, From Markets to Venues, supra note 7.
13 For example, in 2001, the NASDAQ, which is not technically an exchange, garnered
55% of total trading volume. Many of the best known and most heavily traded U.S. stocks, such
as Intel, Microsoft, MCI, Dell Computer, Nestle, and Cisco Systems, have elected to eschew
exchange listings entirely. Trading venues (including exchanges) can earn money on the basis
of the sale of trade data, and by charging fees for trading volume.
14 NYSE Launches Competitive Initiatives, EXCHANGE (NYSE, New York, N.Y.), Oct.
1999, at 1.
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the competitive problem for exchanges has arisen because of changes
in technology. At one time the fixed-site locations of exchanges gave
exchanges an unrivaled ability to monitor trading on behalf of inves-
tors. Now that off-exchange trading takes place via computer rather
than via telephone, it is possible to monitor off-exchange trading very
effectively. As long ago as 1976, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission recognized that over-the-counter trades were not "intrinsi-
cally more difficult to monitor than exchange transactions."' 5
B. Standard-form Legal Rules
The NYSE once served as an independent source of corporate
governance rules for listed firms. Rules regarding disclosure, capital
structure, audit committees, and other aspects of corporate govern-
ance were supplied by the NYSE before the SEC even existed.
16
However, the NYSE's role as an independent source of legal rules for
listed firms has all but disappeared.
17
In February, 2002, Harvey Pitt, then Chairman of the SEC, sent his
now-famous "Dick and Wick" letter to Richard (Dick) Grasso, CEO
of the NYSE, and Wick Simmons, Chairman of NASDAQ, which
called upon these securities markets to strengthen their corporate gov-
15 Exchange Act Release No. 34,11942, 41 Fed. Reg. 4507, 4512 (Jan. 30, 1976). Nor has
the NYSE been immune from complaints about the quality of its own monitoring services. The
recent scandal on the NYSE involving front-running by floor brokers shows that the NYSE
cannot promise listing firms an infraction-free trading environment. The point here, however, is
not that the NYSE is not committed to careful and effective monitoring of listed stocks. Rather,
the argument is merely that the NYSE no longer enjoys a unique ability to monitor that cannot
be matched by the NASD or even by proprietary trading systems like Instinet. Perhaps most
importantly, regardless of where a firm's shares trade, traders are bound by the SEC's rules
barring manipulation and insider trading, and mandating that customers receive the best execu-
tion of orders placed with brokers. These SEC rules have eroded the NYSE's dominant position
by creating a trading environment in which investors have the same protections both on the
NYSE and in alternative trading venues. The SEC's ability to monitor and enforce its rules
further diminishes the NYSE's historical position as providing the country's most honest and
open market. Now the NYSE is simply one of many honest and open American equity markets.
16 George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the
Securities Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 133 (1973); see also George J. Stigler, Public
Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964) (observing past public policies and
new public policies created by the regulation of the securities markets).
17 Cf., Paul Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997) (arguing
that stock exchanges remain, even in modem times, the best institution to regulate the trading
markets). Mahoney's analysis focuses on regulation of the securities markets and not corporate
governance rules, and is therefore of limited relevance here. However, while Mahoney's argu-
ment that exchanges have strong incentives to provide rules of market structure that investors
want and to compel adherence by their members to contractual and fiduciary obligations has
considerable appeal, he does not come to grips with the fact that the exchanges may no longer
have the power to compel firms to comply with the regulations they promulgate. One way of
measuring the effectiveness of organized exchanges in dealing with aberrant corporate conduct
is to examine the correlation between exchange affiliation and accounting scandals. See also
Macey & O'Hara, From Markets to Venues, supra note 7 at manuscript p. 17-20.
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ernance rules.1 8 However, the current rule-making initiatives, though
impressive, should not be confused with earlier generations of private
rule-making by the New York Stock Exchange and other securities
market-based Self-Regulatory Organizations ("SROs"). The differ-
ence is that the SROs are currently promulgating rules not independ-
ently, but rather at the behest, and under the guidance and control of,
the SEC.
Consistent with this analysis, there are no sharp differences the
structure and content of the proposed new NYSE and the NASDAQ
corporate governance rules.' There are no sharp differences. Both
plans call for increasing board independence and increasing the role
and authority of independent directors. 20 The point is that, unlike in
the past, rival markets now coordinate their listing standards so that
listing decisions will not be made on the basis of these provisions.
Rather, listing decisions are now made on the basis of whether the
market on which the firm is listing provides liquidity for the share-
holders of the listing firms.
Historically, exchanges and other SROs engaged in self-
governance in order to attract new listings. Self-governance in that
era was characterized by an effort at product differentiation. Rules
reflected an effort by exchanges to attract a particular clientele of
firms. This is no longer the case.
In that earlier era, the relationship between issuers and stock ex-
changes was purely contractual, and the SEC's authority was virtually
non-existent. Exchanges were interested in promulgating investor-
protection rules as a means of attracting listing firms that wanted to
make a credible commitment to investors that they had permanently
"opted-in" to a legal regime featuring significant investor protections.
Over time, the nature of the exchanges' rule-making function has
changed from being an independent promulgator of rules to being a
surrogate of the SEC. The changes occurred in three stages. First,
competitive pressures deprived the exchanges of both the willingness
and the ability to initiate corporate governance standards for listed
i8 See Press Release, Chairman Harvey L. Pitt of the SEC, Pitt Seeks Review of Corporate
Governance, Conduct Codes (Feb. 13, 2002) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Re-
view), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-23.txt (last visited Jun. 1, 2005).
19 See listing of rule change proposals and amendments of the NYSE, available at
http://www.nyse.com/listed/p 020656067970.html?displayPage=%2Fabout%2F 104551649039
4.html (last visited Jun. 1, 2005); listing of NASD's proposed rules, available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/ProposedRuleChanges.stm (last visited Jun. 1, 2005).
20 There are minor differences. For example, the NYSE proposes a five-year "cooling-
off' period before former employees of a listed company can become board members. The
NASDAQ's proposed cooling off period is only three years. But in important areas, such as
directors' compensation and prohibitions on audit committees from receiving any payment other
than for board services, the rules are identical.
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firms. Second, the National Market System legislation of 1975 gave
the SEC broad power not only to oversee, but actually to control, any
changes to corporate governance rules being made under the auspices
of an exchange. Finally, SOX largely displaced the states from their
traditional role in regulating corporate governance, and gave the SEC
even more leverage to impose its will on the exchanges.
1. Competitive Pressures
The stock exchanges' ability to serve as effective self-regulatory
organizations depends on their ability to sanction listed firms that
break their rules. The ability of exchanges to sanction listed firms
depends, in turn, on the market power of the exchange. Historically,
an exchange such as the New York Stock Exchange was a very effec-
tive self-regulatory organization because it could enforce its
rules-and thereby enable listing firms to make credible commit-
ments to obey the exchange's rules-by threatening to de-list firms
that disobeyed their rules.
As technology and rival markets developed, the threat of de-listing
has subsided. Firms that were de-listed would simply move to rival
trading venues with similar liquidity characteristics, and more conge-
nial rules.2'
The paradigmatic illustration of this phenomenon is the one-share,
one-vote listing requirement. During the 1980s, the senior manage-
ment teams of several firms that were listed on the New York Stock
Exchange were concerned about the possibility of a hostile takeover,
and wanted to adopt a particularly potent defensive strategy, which
involved recapitalizing the firm with additional classes of voting
stock, to be held by management, which would have significantly
greater voting rights than the shares held by other shareholders. The
problem with this recapitalization strategy was that it clearly violated
an unambiguous NYSE rule providing that all shares of common
stock of listed companies could have one, and only one, vote.
Significantly, several venerable listed firms, notably General Mo-
tors Corporation and Dow Jones, Inc., that wanted to engage in these
so-called "dual-class recapitalizations" elected to proceed with their
plans and risk de-listing. The consequences for these firms would
simply have been that their shares would have migrated to a rival
trading venue, such as the American Stock Exchange or the
NASDAQ, both of which permitted dual-class recapitalizations. The
result was that the NYSE was forced to relax its listing requirements,
21 See Macey & O'Hara, From Markets to Venues, supra note 7.
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and to petition the SEC to impose a uniform voting rights standard for
all publicly traded firms.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Busi-
ness Roundtable v. SEC,22 ultimately held that the SEC did not have
the authority to adopt a uniform voting rights standard.23 However,
by the time the Court had ruled, the NASD, the AMEX, and the
NYSE had adopted the SEC's proposed rule, and none was willing to
risk its ongoing relationship with the SEC by returning to its previous
rule.24 Moreover, the ruling in Business Roundtable that the SEC
lacked the authority to promulgate rules of corporate governance has
been weakened considerably, if not eviscerated entirely, by the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002, which gave a significant amount of new
25power to the SEC in the realm of corporate governance.
2. The National Market System Legislation
Another significant break with the past occurred in 1975, when
Congress passed its National Market System legislation,26 which
"vested the SEC with broad flexible authority to design, implement,
and regulate the trading markets. 27 Of particular relevance to the
instant inquiry was the fact that the new rules gave the SEC the au-
thority to approve, to disapprove, and even to add to or delete any
rules that the exchanges proposed to adopt.
28
The 1975 National Market System legislation was "intended to
harmonize SEC authority over various SROs by expanding the Ex-
22 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
23 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
24 With SEC involvement, the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ adopted a uniform listing
standard resembling SEC Rule 19c-4. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING PARTNERSHIP AND LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES 727 (8th ed. 2003); see also RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW &
FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 748-51 (2d ed. 1995).
25 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C.A. §7201, §§ 7211-7219 (West 2005).
26 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 249, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (1975)) (adding section 1 IA to the Exchange Act).
27 Karmel, supra note 8, at 339.
28 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s (West 2005) (amended 1975).
Section 19(b) of the Act requires SROs such as the NASD and the NYSE to file proposed rule
changes with the SEC, and to get the Commission's approval for rule changes. 19(b) requires
the SEC to approve an Exchange's proposed rule change "if it finds that such proposed rule
change is consistent with the requirements of the [Securities Exchange Act of 1934.]" Under
Section 19(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC is given the power to "abrogate,
add to, and delete . . . the rules of a self-regulatory organization" such as the NYSE or the
NASD, but only "to conform its rules to the requirements of [the Act,] or otherwise in further-
ance of the purposes of the Act." Id. Under 19(c), the SEC has authority to impose new SRO
rules or to amend or delete existing ones: (1) whenever it "deems [it] necessary or appropriate to
insure the fair administration of the [SRO]"; or (2) "to conform [the SRO's] rules to require-
ments of [the Exchange Act applicable to SROs]"; or (3) "otherwise in furtherance of the pur-
poses of the Exchange Act." Id.
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change Act to cover Nasdaq. ' 29 While the National Market System
legislation, as interpreted by the D.C. Circuit in the Business Round-
table decision, does not give the SEC the power unilaterally to im-
pose corporate governance listing standards, there is no question that
the exchanges can impose such standards on themselves. And there is
no question that the SEC can, and does, take an active role in shaping
these standards during the approval process. The exchanges' on-
going relationships with the SEC gives these markets significant in-
centives to cooperate with the SEC's views on corporate governance
issues.
3. Sarbanes-Oxley
With the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in the wake of the Enron-era
corporate governance scandals, it is at least arguable that "federal law
now occupies the largest part of the legal corporate governance struc-
ture in the twenty-first century. '30 Sarbanes-Oxley contains provi-
sions requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify financial statements, bar-
ring loans to executive officers and directors, and requiring the crea-
tion and maintenance of adequate internal controls by corporations,
among many other provisions related directly to corporate govern-
ance.
The implications of Sarbanes-Oxley on the current analysis are
two-fold. First, the increased role of federal law in corporate govern-
ance further displaces any residual role that the exchanges might have
in the formation of corporate governance rules. Second, as noted
above, Sarbanes-Oxley has dramatically eroded the court's decision
in Business Roundtable. In that opinion, the court held that the SEC
had authority to make stock exchange rules only in furtherance of the
purposes of the Exchange Act, and lacked the power to promulgate
general rules of corporate governance. However, Sarbanes-Oxley
clearly has moved corporate governance into the Exchange Act, par-
ticularly the conduct of audit committees, and monitoring and control
by directors and senior officers. Thus, it seems clear that the SEC
now can promulgate exchange rules in furtherance of these purposes.
These sorts of rules clearly involve corporate governance.While the securities laws and the SEC are the most important al-
ternative providers of legal rules for public firms, they are by no
means the only sources of such rules. State legislatures, particularly
29 Robert Todd Lang et al., Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and
Corporate Governance, 57 Bus. LAW. 1487, 1517 (2002).
30 Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REv., 859,861-62 (2003).
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Delaware, and a wide range of independent legal organizations in-
cluding the American Law Institute (which promulgated the ALI's
Principles of Corporate Governance), the American Bar Association's
Committee on Corporate Laws (which promulgated the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act), and the Financial Accounting Standards
Board, all provide rules of corporate governance and practice that are
more significant than the rules provided by the NYSE. Historically,
Delaware has been the most significant source of corporate govern-
ance rules for companies. As Roberta Romano has observed, "[s]tate
regulation does, moreover, offer some decided benefits over stock
exchange regulation: a more effective mechanism of private dispute
resolution for securities suits against issuers, and a public enforce-
ment system, should the deterrent effect of criminal prosecution for
securities law violations be a necessary complement to civil liabil-ity. , 3 1
In sum, it is clear that the NYSE and other trading venues are no
longer the primary or even a particularly significant arbiter of corpo-
rate governance rules for listing firms. Rather the corporate govern-
ance rules promulgated by the exchanges and other trading venues
actually reflect: (a) an effort by the exchanges to "cartelize" the pro-
duction of their regulatory activities, and (b) an effort by the SEC to
use the exchanges' rule-making process to inject themselves into cor-
porate governance in a way prohibited directly by the D.C. Circuit's
decision in Business Roundtable.
C. Signaling
Historically, in exchange for listing fees, the NYSE lent its own
substantial reputation to listing firms. The idea was that many of the
firms traded in secondary capital markets may be well known region-
ally, but they may not enjoy a national or international reputation.
For such firms, the international reputation of the NYSE as a forum
where the shares of high quality, high liquidity firms were traded was,
and is, a valuable resource. For less well-known firms, the NYSE
served as a reputational intermediary. Investors who knew nothing
about a particular firm listed on the NYSE derived information about
the firm from the very fact that the NYSE had agreed to list it for
trading. For example when Canandaigua Brands, Inc. listed on the
NYSE, Richard Sands, its chairman and CEO, defended the decision
31 ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES
REGULATION 145 (2002).
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on the grounds that "[t]he move to the NYSE will support our growth
by enhancing our visibility throughout the world. 32
Just as a NYSE listing is no longer a guarantee that listing firms
will agree to abide by the NYSE's rules and regulations regarding
corporate governance,33 exchange listings in general no longer convey
any signal that trading in the firm's shares will be conducted with
greater probity. The SEC, rather than the exchanges, now promul-
gates and enforces the rules regarding trading practices. Thus, rival
trading venues no longer have any claim to providing a more fair or
investor-friendly trading environment than their competitors.
There are a plethora of other, more effective information interme-
diaries that provide signals about the quality of firms whose shares
trade in secondary markets. These rival information intermediaries
include investment banks, law firms, accounting firms, rating agen-
cies, and the SEC (which approves registration statements and en-
forces rules against false and misleading statements in connection
with the purchase and sale of securities). Finally, as technology, par-
ticularly the use of the Internet as a research tool, has lowered the cost
of research about traded companies, the demand for this aspect of the
exchanges' traditional bundle of services has declined. It is simply no
longer reasonable to assume that a firm whose shares trade on venues
such as the NYSE is of higher quality than a firm that trades on rival
venues.
Firms that trade in markets with severely under-developed legal
systems and with weak reputational intermediaries will still value the
reputational capital associated with an exchange listing. Such a list-
ing illustrates that the listing firm has agreed to comply with local
(U.S.) accounting laws.
D. Clearing Services
For much of the NYSE's history there were no substitutes for the
Exchange's role in ensuring the reliability of counter-parties contrac-
tual obligations. Obviously, it is important that traders be able to rely
on the fact that they will receive timely payment for securities sold
and timely delivery of securities purchased. The NYSE's ability to
provide such assurances gave it a strong competitive advantage. The
NYSE still provides clearing services. But investment banks and
commercial banks also provide such services. The success of the huge
foreign exchange and U.S. government securities markets demon-
32 NYSE Listings: New Listings September 20 - October 15, EXCHANGE (NYSE, New
York, N.Y.), Nov. 1999, at 6.
33 See the discussion of the one-share, one-vote controversy, supra Part I.B. 1.
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strates that the Exchange is no longer the sole provider of reliable,
large-scale clearing services.
Moreover, markets have developed to the point at which clearing
services can be separated (unbundled) from trading services. Special-
ized firms like Bear Steams Securities Corp. provide clearing services
for other broker-dealer firms who do not want to invest in creating
and maintaining their own clearing services. The Exchanges are no
longer essential for clearing.
E. Liquidity
The advantages of listing on a particular exchange such as the New
York Stock Exchange in order to achieve better monitoring, better
signaling, superior legal rules, and more reliable clearing have been
eroded. For the reasons specified above, it is no longer plausible to
defend a decision to list on a particular exchange on the grounds that
it provides these sorts of advantages. Instead, trading venues compete
for trading volume, regardless of whether they are exchanges, like the
NYSE, or "markets" like the NASDAQ, or Automated Trading Sys-
tems like Instinet or an Electronic Trading Network, like Datek.
When it comes to providing liquidity for listing firms, however,
there appears to be significantly more product differentiation. Here
the critical questions are: (1) whether one trading venue is superior to
another; and (2) whether a strategy of isolating trading on a particular
venue is superior to simultaneous trading on multiple venues for any
issuers.
Investors value the ability to buy and to sell their shares quickly
and cheaply at prices closely approximating to the present value of
the future income to investors associated with those shares. Because
the bid-asked spread represents a transaction cost to investors, inves-
tors value a narrow bid-asked spread. In other words, investors value
low trading costs and fair and orderly markets. They value liquidity.
In the over-the-counter markets, liquidity is provided via competi-
tion among dealers and other market professionals. On alternative
trading systems, liquidity arises from the interaction of customer or-
ders. Because liquidity arises endogenously (which is to say that
there is no other source of liquidity other than customer orders), li-
quidity may vanish when market conditions turn adverse.
On the New York Stock Exchange, the listing fee paid by listed
firms buys the bundle of services provided by an exchange specialist.
The NYSE's Allocation Committee assigns a specialist to each listed
firm. In turn, each specialist has an affirmative obligation to "main-
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tain fair and orderly markets" in the stocks in which they specialize.
According to the Exchange s rules:
The maintenance of a fair and orderly market implies the
maintenance of price continuity with reasonable depth, and
the minimizing of the effects of temporary disparity between
supply and demand.
In connection with the maintenance of a fair and orderly mar-
ket, it is commonly desirable that a member acting as a spe-
cialist engage to a reasonable degree under existing circum-
stances in dealings for his own account when lack of price
continuity, lack of depth, or disparity between supply and
demand exists or is reasonably to be anticipated.34
Recent research has argued, however, that this affirmative obligation
does not benefit investors.35 It does not appear to reduce share vola-
tility or make markets more efficient. 36
Although in the past exchange specialists may have had the ability
to have a marginal impact on the maintenance of fair and orderly
markets, it is clear that they are no longer able to do so. Now that
NYSE-listed stocks trade on multiple venues, specialists must enjoy a
monopoly position in order to be able to carry out this obligation.
The specialists' ability to maintain fair and orderly markets depends
upon their ability to reap sufficient profits during the easy times when
volatility is low and trading volume is high (so that the specialists are
"earning" the bid-asked spread), so that they can afford to take the
losses associated with maintaining fair and orderly markets when
market conditions become more uncertain, and their regulatory obli-
gation becomes costly.
However, when trading on multiple venues is possible, as it is to-
day, the affirmative obligation of market-makers makes no sense.
Specialists who attempt to make sufficient profits during times of
low-volatility and/or high trading volume to compensate for expected
losses during times of high volatility and times of low trading volume
will find themselves losing market share to rival venues. This market
share will only return when market conditions change and the special-
ists must incur the costs of maintaining a fair and orderly market.
34 NYSE Guide, (CCH) 2104.10 at 2705.
35 See Hans R. Stoll, Reconsidering the Affirmative Obligations of Market Makers, 54 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 72 (Sept. 1, 1998).
36 Id.
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Finally, it is important to note that the affirmative obligation of
market makers to provide liquidity is needed the least for large firms
with heavy trading volumes. Firms with large numbers of shares out-
standing and heavy trading provide the greatest number of trading
opportunities and the largest number of profit-making opportunities
for market professionals. Thus, it is not plausible that firms like
Coca-Cola or IBM would lose liquidity if they ceased being traded on
the NYSE. Likewise, it is not plausible that shares in Intel or Apple
would become more liquid if they started trading on the NYSE.
A more interesting question is whether the benefits of multi-venue
trading outweigh the costs. The benefits of multi-market trading
come in the form of increased competition for "order flow" among
rival trading venues. The costs come in the form of fragmentation:
where trading occurs simultaneously on a variety of trading venues, it
not only may be difficult to identify the best price, but low-cost com-
petitors may be able to "free-ride" on the costly price-setting activi-
ties of high-quality rivals. This free-riding manifests itself in the
form of "cream-skimming" of the most profitable trading by low-
price trading venues.
Part III of this Article evaluates these issues. For now, the only
point that needs to be made is that listing fees make it possible, at
least in theory, for a particular trading venue to specialize in the
promulgation of corporate governance rules for listed firms. Even if
securities trade in multiple venues, issuing firms that wanted to "opt
into" the particular corporate governance regime created by a specific
stock exchange could do so listing on that exchange. The listing fees
paid by the firm would compensate the exchange for any costs it in-
curred establishing and maintaining the corporate governance regime.
The problem is that the act of "opting into" a particular corporate
governance regime is only a valuable signal to investors (and thus
useful to issuers as a method for lowering capital costs) to the extent
that firms cannot suddenly decide that they no longer wish to main-
tain their commitment to the exchange's corporate governance re-
gime, and then de-list in order to rid themselves of their prior obliga-
tions.
This is precisely the problem today: acting unilaterally, stock ex-
changes and other trading venues are no longer in a position to act as
effective self-governance organizations because the act of listing
serves as a commitment committed to that trading venue's corporate
governance regime only as long as the firm decides to remain volun-
tarily listed. A problem exists because, as we saw in the case of the
one-share, one-vote controversy, firms that choose to flaunt exchange
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rules "mid-stream" (after their shares are issued and outstanding), can
do so with impunity. The following section deals with the legal issue
of whether issuers and exchanges can deal with this issue contractu-
ally.
A remaining critical issue raised by the existence of multi-
jurisdictional trading venues is whether such trading affects liquidity,
irrespective of corporate governance issues. It could be that commit-
ting a company to the corporate governance rules of a particular ex-
change or trading venue is optimal from a corporate governance per-
spective, but sub-optimal from a liquidity perspective. The critical
issue here is the trade-off between the salutary effects of competition
that multi-venue trading brings as contrasted with the potential harms
of fragmentation associated with multi-venue trading. Part III dis-
cusses these issues.
II. CONTROL OF TRADING VENUE: THE FORGOTTEN ROLE OF SHARE
TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS
From the above discussion it seems conceivable that firms might
find it in their interests to limit trading in the securities they have is-
sued to a single trading venue. This section explores why we do not
observe firms putting such restrictions in place.
At the outset, we wish to note that firms rarely make an effort to
do this. One explanation, of course, is that firms are unable to limit
where their securities trade. This explanation posits that there are
legal and regulatory restrictions that make it impossible for firms to
effectuate restrictions regarding the venue on which their securities
trade. An alternative explanation is that firms do not attempt to place
restrictions on the venue where their securities trade because such
restrictions would harm shareholders. A final explanation is that,
while firms have the power to implement restrictions, agency costs
prevent them from doing so. According to this hypothesis, restric-
tions on trading venues would benefit investors but harm managers.
The presence of agency costs (the costs associated with investors'
efforts to monitor and control managers), however, creates a situation
in which firms do not adopt trading restrictions, despite the benefits
such restrictions might have for shareholders.
The pre-existing legal scholarship on the role played by issuers in
determining where shares trade asserts that "[t]he issuer's role in de-
termining how and where its securities are traded is severely limited
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under current U.S. regulatory policy. ' 37 This scholarship is, in our
view, both analytically and descriptively flawed.
The scholarship is flawed analytically because it fails to distin-
guish between ex ante efforts to control trading venue and ex post
efforts to control trading venue. Specifically, there is a crucial differ-
ence between issuers' efforts to control trading venue at the time of a
firm's initial public offering (ex ante), and subsequent efforts to con-
trol trading venue (ex post) after investors have purchased the securi-
ties and are trading in secondary markets.
The scholarship is flawed descriptively because it looks only at
federal law, and only at issuers' efforts to control trading venue in
secondary markets after securities have been sold. It ignores issuers'
ability to control trading venue by inserting valid share transfer re-
strictions at the time the securities are first sold.
A. Unlisted Trading Privileges
As Amihud and Mendelson have observed, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission has taken a dim view of issuers' efforts to restrict
the trading venue of their securities, once those securities have been
issued and already are being traded.38 In particular, the SEC routinely
grants so-called "unlisted trading privileges" to securities exchanges.
Unlisted trading privileges, as the name implies, give a particular
trading venue the privilege of trading a security in situations in which
the issuer of the securities has not asked permission for its securities
to be traded in (listed on) that venue.
Under the Unlisted Trading Privileges Act of 1994,39 regional
stock exchanges were actually encouraged to extend unlisted trading
privileges to stocks listed on other trading venues. That statute sim-
ply codified a long-standing SEC policy of acquiescing in requests by
regional exchanges for unlisted trading privileges.40
Occasionally, issuers have tried to control trading in their securi-
ties after their securities already have been issued, but these efforts
have been uniformly unsuccessful. 41 Two points about these efforts
by issuers to control trading venue are worth making.
37 Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of Trading
Across Securities Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1411, 1416 (1996).
38 See id. at 1416-26 (describing the issuer's role under current U.S. regulatory policy).
39 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(0 (West 1994) (providing that unlisted trading privileges for se-
curities originally listed on another national exchange may be granted to "any security that is
listed and registered on a national securities exchange").
40 140 CONG. REC. H6508 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1994) (statement of Rep. Markey).
41 See, e.g., In re Edison Elec. illuminating Co., Exchange Act Release No. 986, 1 S.E.C.
909 (Dec. 16, 1936) (rejecting effort by company to block the granting of unlisted trading privi-
leges in its bonds by the New York Curb Exchange); In re Providence Gas Co., Exchange Act
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First, it appears that the SEC's reluctance to block the grant of
unlisted trading privileges, at least in some cases, has furthered share-
holder interests by blocking managers' efforts to entrench themselves
in office. For example, in In re Providence Gas Company,42 manag-
ers of a public utility wanted to limit ownership in the stock of the
company to customers of the company. The managers sought to ef-
fectuate this policy by limiting trading in the firm's securities to the
local over-the-counter market. This policy was upset when the New
York Curb Exchange (now the American Stock Exchange) granted
unlisted trading privileges to the company's stock. The company then
unsuccessfully tried to litigate to block the New York Curb Ex-
change's move to extend unlisted trading privileges to the company's
stock. Here it seems clear that the interests of management in restrict-
ing trading were unlikely to have been shared by the company's
shareholders, whose interests were in expanding the investor base to
improve liquidity in the company's shares. Management, on the other
hand, would care less about liquidity and more about limiting outsid-
ers' access in the company's shares in order to reduce the possibility
of a hostile takeover attempt.
Thus, in this context at least, it appears that the liberal use of
unlisted trading privileges serves shareholder interests and reduces
agency costs.
Second, as the following section of this article explains, even if
unlisted trading privileges are liberally granted, issuers are not neces-
sarily helpless to effectuate restrictions on the venues on which their
securities trade. Because they require unanimous shareholder ap-
proval, and thus cannot be used by managers as easily to exploit
shareholders, share transfer restrictions are a far more attractive strat-
egy for restricting trading venue than the refusal to grant unlisted
trading privileges.
B. Share Transfer Restrictions
A share transfer restriction is a provision in the articles of incorpo-
ration of a company that restricts, in some way or other, the ability of
shareholders to transfer their shares to other investors. Those writing
Release No. 1992, 4 S.E.C. 395 (January 19, 1939) (rejecting issuer's attempt to terminate the
granting of unlisted trading privileges in the company's common stock by the New York Curb
Exchange); In re Chicago Rivet & Mach. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 3395, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 75,369 (March 16, 1943) (same); Ludlow Corp. v. SEC, 604 F.2d 704 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (permitting, over the issuer's objection, the Boston Stock Exchange to grant unlisted
trading privileges to stock already trading on the New York Stock Exchange).
42 Exchange Act Release No. 1992, 4 S.E.C. 395 (Jan. 19, 1939).
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about control of trading venue by issuers have considered only the
relevance of unlisted trading privileges in their analysis. They have
ignored the fact that it may be possible for firms that want to limit
trading in their shares to a particular venue to use share transfer re-
strictions to accomplish this objective. This strategy is more likely to
be successful than efforts to block the extension of unlisted trading
privileges.
In general, stock certificates (and other, more modem indicia of
share ownership) are regarded as personal property, and are subject to
the traditional, common law rule that there be no unreasonable re-
straint on alienation.43 Share transfer restrictions, however, are
widely used by corporations and serve a number of valid purposes.
For example, they ensure that a corporation will continue to satisfy
certain regulatory requirements, such as Subchapter S of the Internal
Revenue Code, which grants preferred (pass-through) tax treatment to
corporations but requires them to have no more than 100 sharehold-
ers;" ensure that the company retains exemptions from the registra-
tion requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 that prohibit the pub-
lic offering of unregistered securities.45 In addition, share transfer
restrictions are commonly used to maintain a family's control over a
particular corporation, to maintain the status quo ownership structure
among shareholders, or to permit shareholders in closely held corpo-
rations to control the identity of new investors.46
While the general rule is that shares of stock are freely transfer-
able, share transfer restrictions are valid in the vast majority of states
as long as the restrictions they impose are reasonable under the cir-
cumstance.47 The modem rule of share transfer restrictions, in other
43 See Rafe v. Hinden, 288 N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968), aff'd 244 N.E.2d
469 (N.Y. 1968); Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 141 N.E.2d 812, 814 (N.Y. 1957); Penthouse
Properties v. 1158 Fifth Ave., 11 N.Y.S.2d 417 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939).
- 26 U.S.C.A. § 1361 (West Supp. 2005).
45 15 U.S.C.A. §77e (West 2002).
46 This latter restriction is valuable in circumstances where, for example, state law limits
share ownership in a professional medical corporation to doctors, or ownership in a professional
legal corporation to licensed attorneys. These restrictions similarly allow shareholders to
choose their business associates, to restrict ownership to family members, and to ensure conge-
nial and knowledgeable associates. Share transfer restrictions also can prevent business com-
petitors from purchasing shares. There are also important tax planning reasons for the restric-
tions.
47 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §6.27 (1999); CAL. CORP. CODE §418 (West 2004);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 202 (2004). In addition to the requirement that share transfer restric-
tions be reasonable, in order for such restrictions to be valid (except as to transferees with actual
knowledge of the restrictions), the existence of the restrictions must be noted conspicuously on
the share certificates that are subject to the restrictions. The Model Business Corporation Act,
for example, provides that the stock legend giving notice of the existence of share transfer
restrictions must be printed in italics, boldface, contrasting color, typed in capital letters, or
underlined. MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT § 1.40(3) (1999).
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words, "balances two conflicting corporate tenets: free alienability of
corporate ownership interests and private corporate structuring to
meet the participants' needs. ''4
If it is truly the case, as some have argued,49 that issuers may be
able to improve the quality of secondary market trading in their shares
by limiting trading in their shares to a particular trading venue, then a
share transfer restriction containing such a limitation would be valid.
Suppose, for example, an issuer was concerned that multi-venue trad-
ing would increase investors' trading costs by increasing the bid-
asked spread in the issuers' securities. When making its initial public
offering, a genuinely-concerned issuer could impose a share transfer
restriction limiting trading in the company's shares to, say, the New
York Stock Exchange.
Such a restriction seems valid, since it serves a legitimate purpose
and is not "unreasonable" in any way. More importantly, the use of
share transfer restrictions appears to be categorically superior as a
means for controlling trading venue than the traditional method of
issuers bringing lawsuits against trading venues on which they would
prefer not to have their shares trade. For one thing, where restrictions
on trading venue are effectuated through share-transfer restrictions,
investors would have notice of the imposition of such restrictions. By
contrast, when restrictions on trading venue are effectuated through
lawsuits, shareholders have no notice and, therefore, no input into
whether the restriction should be put into place.
Second, share transfer restrictions efficiently control trading venue
because they impose a unanimity requirement on restrictions on trad-
ing venue at very low cost. Where share transfer restrictions are util-
ized to restrict trading venues, potential investors who would prefer a
wider range of choices about trading venue, or who otherwise disap-
prove of such restrictions, can simply decide not to purchase the
shares. As the discussion of In re Providence Gas illustrated, it is
highly likely that restrictions on trading venue will benefit some
shareholders (incumbent managers) but harm others (outside share-
holders). The use of share transfer restrictions permits the sharehold-
ers who are harmed by the imposition of such restrictions to respond,
either by declining to invest in the first place, or by adjusting the price
they pay for their shares by an amount sufficient to make up for the
losses resulting from of the restrictions.
48 LEWIS D. SOLOMON & ALAN R. PALM1TER, CORPORATIONS: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS § 26.6.3 (3d ed. 1999).
49 See Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 37, at 1433-42 (discussing how multi-market
trading may be harmful by decreasing value through reduced liquidity in the firm).
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Thus, share transfer restrictions are a more legally-defensible and
economically-efficient mechanism for restricting trading venue than
the historically unsuccessful strategy of having incumbent manage-
ment commence litigation in order to prevent undesired venues from
trading a company's shares. Nevertheless, we do not generally ob-
serve issuers attempting to impose restrictions on a firm's trading
venue. As the next section makes clear, the most plausible explana-
tion for the lack of interest by issuers in restricting trading venue is
that such restrictions are not in the interest of either issuers or inves-
tors. The costs of restricting trading venue appear to be higher than
the benefits, resulting in a general lack of demand for imposing such
restrictions.
Ill. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RESTRICTING TRADING VENUE
Thus far, multi-market trading has been viewed as involving a
simple trade-off between the virtue of competition and the vices of
fragmentation. Competition is good because it leads to lower transac-
tion costs for investors, lower capital costs for issuers, and ultimately
to higher securities prices on a risk-adjusted basis.50 Fragmentation
occurs when orders that could be executed in a single market are exe-
cuted in multiple markets. Fragmentation is bad, in theory, because it
reduces the number of traders in a particular market and therefore
may reduce the probability of a particular trader finding the optimal
counter-party in that market. Single-venue trading has the virtue of
eliminating the specter of fragmentation. Multi-venue trading has the
virtue of fostering competition. As Amihud and Mendelson observe:
The effect of multimarket trading on liquidity is ambiguous
because of the conflicting effects of competition and frag-
mentation. On one hand, multimarket trading may generate
liquidity improvements due to enhanced intermarket competi-
tion. On the other hand, it may hurt liquidity because it in-
duces fragmentation of the order flow between markets ....
An economy's decision about how to balance the costs and bene-
fits of fragmentation and competition will determine the answer to
one of the most enduring questions in finance: how to construct the
most efficient national market system for a particular economy.
50 See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J.
FIN. ECON. 223 (1986).
51 Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 37, at 1433.
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Because of the large variety of factors involved in determining
whether a particular trading structure is efficient, The goal of con-
structing an efficient securities transaction system is elusive. In par-
ticular, "[e]fficient execution clearly involves a transactional compo-
nent in the sense of minimizing execution costs for traders, but it must
also surely involve the notion of price discovery or of prices being
efficient in the sense of impounding information. 52
Further complicating the analysis is the fact that investors are a
very heterogeneous group. Institutional customers who want to effec-
tuate large block trades have very different concerns than small retail
investors who want to execute smaller trades. Large block traders
will be concerned about the impact of his trade on the bid price of the
security, and therefore will very likely be interested in retaining their
anonymity until their entire trading strategy has been completed. The
small, retail trader will be concerned with the gap between the bid and
the asked sides of the spread, and with the commission charged by her
broker.53
Another important issue is the relationship between securities trad-
ing and stock market efficiency. Some trades contribute more than
others to the efficiency of the marketplace: some trades contain more
information than others. In addition, it is clear that all trading venues
do not contribute equally to the process of "price discovery," which is
the process by which market-trading moves the price of a security to
reflect new information.
Those most concerned about the problems of fragmentation point
out that the vast majority of price discovery occurs on the exchange
for stocks listed on an organized securities exchange such as the
NYSE.54 Other trading venues play a minimal role, if any, in price
discovery. Worse, market fragmentation in the form of trading on
other venues may well result in "cream-skimming," which, in turn,
reduces the efficacy of the price-setting mechanisms on the primary
market.55 While cream-skimming is a concern, "it does not appear
that the underlying price discovery process requires every order to
participate, nor does it appear to matter if some traders prefer to trade
52 Macey & O'Hara, Regulating Exchanges, supra note 3, at 29.
53 Id.
54 See Joel Hasbrouck, One Security, Many Markets: Determining the Contribution to
Price Discovery, 50 J. FtN. 1175 (1995) (discussing the importance of price information and
price discovery in period of increased fragmentation).
55 See David Easley, Nicholas M. Kiefer, & Maureen O'Hara, Cream-Skimming or Profit
Sharing? The Curious Role of Purchased Order Flow, 51 J. FIN. 811 (1996); Robert H. Battalio,
Third Market Broker-Dealers: Cost Competitors or Cream Skimmers?, 52 J. FIN. 341 (1997).
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off the potential for price improvement for the promise of lower trad-
ing commissions. 56
Empirical studies of the effects of multi-market trading on liquid-
ity obtain results consistent with the theoretical discussion above:
multi-market trading appears to help some firms' investors and harm
others. Khan and Baker studied the multi-market trading in NYSE
and AMEX stocks that occurred when stocks listed on these venues
were granted unlisted trading privileges on regional stock ex-
changes.57 Consistent with the view that pro-competitive benefits of
multi-market trading outweigh the anti-competitive costs of fragmen-
tation, they found that, on average, share prices of listed firms rose by
a statistically significant amount when the extension of unlisted trad-
ing privileges was announced. 8 While the results were generally
positive, however a sizeable minority of the sample of the companies
studied experienced declines in share prices and increased bid-asked
spreads.59
The sort of empirical study just described does not reflect all of the
benefits from competition that occur when multi-market trading is
allowed. Specifically, multi-market trading provides competitive
incentives for exchanges and other trading venues to invest in new
trading technologies and to adopt more efficient internal trading rules
in order to prevent order flow from migrating to other trading ven-
ues.6° In addition, the mere threat of multi-market competition causes
trading venues to tighten bid-asked spreads and generally to offer
better terms to traders in order to discourage entry by new competi-
tors. It is probably not coincidental that the advent of modern, fully
automated trading systems and procedures over the past two decades
corresponds with the rise of multi-market competition.61
It seems clear that, at least for some firms, multi-market trading is
a good idea. In particular, multi-market trading appears like a good
idea for large firms: share prices of firms with low liquidity suffer
more from multi-market listing than the share prices of larger firms
with better liquidity. 62 This makes sense. Large firms, whose securi-
56 Macey & O'Hara, Regulating Exchanges, supra note 3, at 30.
57 Walayet A. Khan & H. Kent Baker, Unlisted Trading Privileges, Liquidity and Stock
Returns, 16 J. FIN. RES. 221 (1993).
58 Id. at 229.
59 Id. at 229-234.
60 KALMAN J. COHEN, ET AL., THE MICROSTRUCTURE OF SECURITIES MARKETS 163
(1986); ROBERT A. SCHwARTZ, RESHAPING THE EQUITIES MARKETS: A GUIDE FOR THE 1990S
175-80 (1991).
61 COHEN, supra note 60, at 163; SCHWARTz, supra note 60, at 172.
62 See Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 37, at 1440, n. 151 (discussing empirical results
in unpublished manuscript by Walayet A. Kahn et al., Competition Versus Consolidation of
Order Flow: Common Stock Listing on Dual Domestic Exchanges (1994) (on file with au-
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
ties exhibit higher trading volume, can more easily support the trading
on multiple venues that is the hallmark of a fragmented market.
Smaller firms, with large numbers of retail traders, may find it in
their interest to eliminate fragmentation by restricting trading to a
single venue. Moreover, the benefits of New York Stock Exchange
practice assigning a single specialist to listing firms, and charging that
specialist with the responsibility to provide liquidity for investors by
maintaining a high quality continuous two-sided market is likely to be
of much greater value to smaller firms than to larger firms.63 Larger
firms have no need for this service, because big firms are followed by
multiple analysts, traded by multiple market-makers, and enjoy large
daily trading volumes that create their own inherent liquidity.
Since some firms seem to benefit and some firms appear to be
harmed by multi-market trading, firms should be able to decide for
themselves what venue is best for their securities. Despite the advan-
tage of venue choice, no firm has even attempted to utilize share
transfer restrictions to restrict the trading venue for their shares.
However, an explanation emerges from the previous discussion.
Small firms, rather than large firms, are the most likely candidates for
banning multi-venue trading. But unlike large firms, which are eligi-
ble to list their shares for trading on venues like the New York Stock
Exchange or the American Stock Exchange, smaller firms must ini-
tially list their shares for trading on other venues and wait until they
become large enough and profitable enough to qualify for listing on
the NYSE or NASDAQ. 64 Thus, it would be irrational for small firms
to limit, ex ante the venue where their securities trade, because doing
so would bar them from being able to migrate to larger, superior trad-
ing venues when they mature.
Large firms, on the other hand, have less incentive to adopt multi-
venue trading restrictions since the greater trading volume in their
shares suggests that they would benefit from trading on multiple mar-
kets.
Another reason why firms are likely to be reluctant to adopt inter-
nal corporate governance rules that prohibit multi-venue trading is
that technological advances have lowered the costs of fragmentation
and increased the benefits of multi-venue trading, and this is a trend
that we can expect to continue. For example, the Internet, intranets,
e-mail, and other electronic communications linkages, have made it
thors)).
63 Macey & O'Hara, Stock Exchange Listing Fees, supra note 3.
64 Id.
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far easier for rival markets to observe in real-time transactions in
other markets. This, in turn, has reduced the costs of fragmentation
because orders can migrate to the markets with the best quotes more
quickly and at lower cost as technology develops. Similarly, Liquid-
ity can migrate away from traditional trading locales with ever-
growing ease and speed, because these technological changes have
forced various trading venues to compete. Indeed, while securities
markets may appear to be fragmented from the perspective of the
trading venues themselves, technology increasingly has made the
markets functionally unified from the perspective of the traders who
are transacting on those markets.
IV. THE ONCE AND FUTURE ROLE OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Small firms are unlikely to desire trading rules that restrict multi-
venue trading, even if such rules are the best sorts of rules for them in
the near-term, because such restrictions would permanently lock them
out of the most desirable trading venues (the NYSE and NASDAQ),
and would prevent them from taking advantage of advances in tech-
nology that make multi-venue trading less problematic.
Large firms are unlikely to desire trading rules that restrict the
venues on which their securities can trade since multi-venue trading is
likely to reduce capital costs by increasing share prices and improving
liquidity for large firms.
From a corporate governance perspective, it seems clear that the
"issuer choice" rule proposed by Amihud and Mendelson to regulate
multi-venue trading is inefficient. Their proposed rule is as follows:
"The security's issuer has the exclusive right to decide where its secu-
rity will be traded. Trading the security in any securities market or
trading system requires the issuer's consent.', 65
The problem with this rule is that it ignores the agency costs (con-
flicts of interest) between issuers and shareholders on the question of
trading venue. Under the rule proposed by Amihud and Mendelson,
management concerned about a takeover could decide to reallocate
trading to trading venues that make hostile takeovers more difficult
and unlikely, despite the fact that such takeovers are likely to be in
the best interests of the shareholders.
In other words, Amihud and Mendelson are wrong to assert that
there is a constant and continuous alignment of interests between the
interests of the issuers and their securities holders.66 In fact, agency
65 Amnihud & Mendelson, supra note 37, at 1443.
66 Id.
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costs are ubiquitous. A far better rule would be to permit issuer
choice, but to require that the issuer's choice be reflected in share
transfer restrictions. As a practical matter for publicly traded compa-
nies, this would require any trading venue restrictions to be put into
place at the time of a firm's initial public offering of the securities,67
and it would prevent opportunistic mid-stream changes by managers
that are contrary to the interests of the shareholders.
The cost of the approach recommended here is its intractability:
Once restrictions are put into place, they are difficult to remove. Re-
moval of existing share transfer restrictions generally requires the
permission of all of the shareholders. This may explain why firms do
not attempt to control trading venue through the use of share transfer
restrictions.
Thus, as a practical matter, we are unlikely to observe issuers at-
tempting to avail themselves of the ability to control trading venue
through the use of share transfer restrictions. And, as discussed
above, the proliferation of trading venues has deprived the stock ex-
changes of their incentives to promulgate general rules of corporate
governance for listed firms that safeguard investors' interests. The
problem is that shareholders face collective action problems. When
managers find it inconvenient to abide by the rules of a particular
exchange, they feel free to migrate to rival trading venues with less-
restrictive rules. For widely disbursed shareholders, expulsion from a
particular trading venue is no longer a salient issue, because the rival
trading venues to which a large firm is likely to migrate will have
liquidity characteristics that are, from the shareholders' perspective,
identical to the liquidity characteristics of the original venue.
The SEC has stepped in and filled this gap by providing "adminis-
trative guidance" for the stock exchanges. This guidance permits the
stock exchanges to continue to involve themselves in corporate gov-
ernance. But the coordinating role now played by the SEC ensures
that no trading venue will lose market share to another venue because
of the content of its corporate governance rule. The cost of this new
regulatory paradigm manifests itself in terms of lower levels of inno-
vation and product differentiation. Where formerly the stock ex-
changes, particularly the New York Stock Exchange, attempted to
67 Technically speaking, share transfer restrictions may be imposed by a company's cer-
tificate of incorporation, or by the bylaws of the company, or by an agreement among any
number of shareholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(b); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §6.27(a)
(1999). However, a share transfer restriction binding less than 100% of shareholders would
present the problems of fragmentation that the share transfer restrictions are trying to avoid.
Share transfer restrictions binding one hundred percent (or close to one hundred percent of
shareholders) would be difficult to implement after the initial public offering because hold-out
and other collective action problems would make it difficult to achieve unanimity ex post.
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distinguish themselves from their rivals by offering superior corporate
governance rules, the emergence of close substitutes for the NYSE
has made that sort of competition impossible.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have argued that a company issuing stock is free
to restrict trading in that stock to a particular trading forum, such as
the NYSE, if they do so through share transfer restrictions and if
those restrictions are reasonable. In our view, a restriction to limit
trading in a security to the NYSE would be reasonable. In order to
restrict trading in this way, the company would have to reasonably
conclude that imposing this restriction would result in net benefits
such as a lower cost of capital and improved liquidity for sharehold-
ers. In addition, the company issuing the securities would have to
comply with certain minimum state law restrictions, such as the re-
quirement that the restriction on transfers outside of the floor of the
NYSE be disclosed and conspicuously noted on share certificates.
Having argued that companies not only can and should be able to
impose reasonable restrictions on the venues in which their securities
trade, we observe that they generally do not. Instead, companies
permit their securities to be traded in multiple venues, including ex-
changes, the NASDAQ system, and ECNs.
This multiple-venue trading has implications for both the internal
rules of corporate governance of the firms whose shares are traded in
multiple markets as well as for the trading rules. With regard to the
former, we argue that stock exchanges are no longer a viable source
of internal rules of corporate governance because they can no longer
enforce the rules of corporate governance that they promulgate.
States, the SEC, and the federal government are all superior substi-
tutes for rules of internal corporate governance for firms. Consistent
with this analysis, we observe that the exchanges essentially have
abdicated to the SEC their role as creators of corporate governance
rules. In other words, although the exchanges at one point promul-
gated corporate governance rules as a means for attracting listings by
differentiating their products from rival exchanges, they currently use
the SEC to coordinate their corporate governance rules with other
exchanges.
With regard to trading rules, we find that for most firms, and cer-
tainly for large firms, the optimal trading rule is to permit multi-
market trading in order to take advantage competing sources of li-
quidity. This argument applies with particular force to firms with
heterogeneous groups of shareholders, some of whom might be better
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served by a different trading venue than others. Moreover, as tech-
nology changes, the benefits of multi-venue trading are likely to in-
crease, while the costs are likely to diminish. Consequently, it ap-
pears to be undesirable for firms to limit themselves to a single venue
through the use of share-transfer restrictions, since doing so would
interfere with the firms' ability to take advantage of changes in tech-
nology that make multi-venue trading increasingly more desirable.
For some small firms, it might make sense to limit trading to a par-
ticular high-quality venue, such as the NYSE. Unfortunately, the
NYSE's listing standards prohibit these smaller firms from listing
their shares. Thus, share transfer restrictions limiting a particular se-
curity's trading to the NYSE are not a viable option for these firms,
either.
